CLA-2 OT:RR:CTF:TCM H236655 EGJ
Port Director
Port of Seattle
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1000 Second Ave., Suite 2100 Seattle, WA 98104
Attn: Lorisa Hubsch, Senior Import Specialist
RE: Application for Further Review of Protest No. 3004-12-100037: Classification and NAFTA Eligibility of Evening Primrose Oil Capsules
Dear Port Director:
This is in response to the Application for Further Review (AFR) of Protest No. 3004-12-100037, dated October 12, 2012, filed by counsel on behalf of Bioriginal Food & Science Corp. (Bioriginal), in response to your classification of evening primrose oil capsules (EPO capsules) under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), and your denial of preferential treatment under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
We note that counsel for Bioriginal submitted a supplement to the AFR in an electronic correspondence to our office dated December 21, 2012. However, in an email dated January 7, 2013, counsel withdrew this supplement. As such, this ruling letter only addresses the arguments presented in the original AFR and in our office’s meeting with Bioriginal’s counsel on February 10, 2014.
FACTS:
The instant AFR arises from a series of events relating to Bioriginal’s importations of encapsulated oils. On March 8, 2000, Bioriginal submitted an AFR of Protest No. 3004-00-100047 to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In the AFR, Bioriginal challenged CBP’s tariff classification of its encapsulated fish oil and encapsulated primrose oil. Bioriginal asserted that the fish oil and primrose oil were classified under heading 2106, HTSUS, as food preparations not elsewhere specified or included. CBP had liquidated the primrose oil under heading 1515, HTSUS, as a vegetable oil, and the fish oil under heading 1517, HTSUS, as an animal oil. Bioriginal also challenged CBP’s decision to deny preferential treatment to the imported merchandise under NAFTA.
In response to Bioriginal’s AFR, CBP issued Headquarters Ruling Letter (HQ) 964014, dated February 8, 2002, which affirmed the Port’s classification of the imported merchandise. Further, CBP determined that the goods did not qualify for preferential treatment under NAFTA.
Subsequently, Bioriginal filed four separate summonses in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) to challenge CBP’s tariff classification and denial of NAFTA preferential treatment for its imported merchandise. Those summonses were Court No. 02-00549, filed August 9, 2002, Court No. 03-00054, filed February 10, 2003, Court No. 04-00037, filed January 22, 2004, and Court No. 04-00228, filed June 3, 2004. Each summons included a list of denied protests from different ports of entry. These protests covered entries of Bioriginal merchandise such as encapsulated primrose oil, fish oil and black currant oil. In each summons, Bioriginal asserted that its encapsulated oils should all be classified in heading 2106, HTSUS, as food preparations. CBP had liquidated all of the entries under either heading 1515, HTSUS, or under heading 1517, HTSUS, as vegetable or animal oils.
Ultimately, on September 23, 2009, a stipulated judgment on an agreed statement of facts was signed and filed for each of Bioriginal’s four court actions. The stipulated judgments do not mention a settlement proposal, nor do they list the names or types of specific capsules. Paragraph three of each stipulated judgment provides as follows:
The parties agree that all encapsulated (and softgel) products subject to this action are classifiable under subheading 2106.90.99, HTSUS, which provides for “Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included: Other: Other: Other: Other: Other: Other,” duty-free under the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).
Per the stipulated judgments, CBP refunded to Bioriginal the duties paid on the subject merchandise. However, on April 21, 2011, CBP Headquarters issued field guidance to the ports which advised the ports to continue to follow HQ 964014 and other rulings which classified Bioriginal’s capsules and similar capsules under headings 1515, HTSUS, and 1517, HTSUS. Thus, the ports liquidated Bioriginal’s subsequent entries of encapsulated oils under these two headings.
In the AFR, Bioriginal asserts that CBP must classify its evening primrose oil (EPO) capsules in heading 2106, HTSUS, pursuant to the stipulated judgments. Further, Bioriginal asserts that CBP cannot disregard the tariff classification in the stipulated judgments unless CBP limits the application of the stipulated judgments by following the procedures set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 1625(d) and 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(d).
Alternatively, Bioriginal argues that the EPO capsules are classifiable as medicaments of heading 3004, HTSUS. As such, Bioriginal claims that the EPO is substantially transformed when it is encapsulated in Canada, and that the EPO capsules are eligible for preferential treatment under the NAFTA.
ISSUES:
1. Are the stipulated judgments of Bioriginal Food & Science Corp. v. United States, Court Nos. 02-00549, 03-00054, 04-00037 and 04-00228, binding on entries which were not subject to the litigation?
2. Must CBP apply the procedures set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1625(d) to stipulated judgments?
3. If the stipulated judgments are not binding, what is the tariff classification of the EPO capsules?
4. Are the EPO capsules eligible for preferential treatment under NAFTA?
LAW AND ANALYSIS:
The matter is protestable as a decision on classification. 19 U.S.C. §1514(a)(2). Bioriginal’s AFR satisfies application criteria because it involves matters previously ruled upon by CBP and the CIT, but legal arguments are presented which were not considered at the time of the original ruling. 19 C.F.R. § 174.24(c). Namely, Bioriginal asserts that CBP must apply the stipulated judgments to future entries of identical merchandise. If not, Bioriginal states that CBP must follow the procedures to limit a court decision set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 1625(d) and 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(d).
STIPULATED JUDGMENT ON AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bioriginal cites to paragraph three of the stipulated judgments, which state that “the parties agree that all encapsulated (and softgel) products subject to this action are classifiable under subheading 2106.90.99, HTSUS, which provides for ‘Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included…’” Bioriginal further cites to an email from the DOJ to Bioriginal’s counsel, which provides a list of seventeen products which are included in the settlement proposal. The list includes capsules of primrose oil. The Protestant states that the stipulated judgment, combined with the DOJ email, indicate that all of the Protestant’s future imports of the listed products should be classified under subheading 2106.90.99, HTSUS.
We disagree. A stipulated judgment is “merely a contract acknowledged in open court and ordered to be recorded, but it binds the parties as fully as other judgments.” Black’s Law Dictionary 918 (9th Ed. 2009); see also Church & Dwight Co., Inc. v. United States, 29 CIT 174, 178 (2005) (Church & Dwight) (“This Court holds that the Stipulated Judgment is an enforceable agreement governed by contract law.”) Customs courts have consistently applied principles of contract law to adjudicate disputes arising from stipulated judgments. See, e.g. Church & Dwight, 29 CIT at 178-179, and Traveler Trading Co. v. United States, 20 CIT 628 (1996) (Traveler Trading). A main principle of contract law is that “if a contract is clear, courts must take care not to alter or go beyond the express terms of the agreement, or to impose obligations that are not mandated by the unambiguous terms of the agreement itself.” Torres v. Walker, 356 F.3d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) cited by Church & Dwight, 29 CIT at 179.
In Traveler Trading, the Plaintiff filed for an order to enforce the settlement agreement and stipulated judgments entered into between CBP and the Plaintiff. The settlement agreement provided that (1) CBP would issue a memorandum stating that certain future entries of merchandise would be classified as festive articles under heading 9505, HTSUS, and (2) both parties would enter into stipulated judgments classifying the merchandise subject to litigation under heading 9505, HTSUS. 20 C.I.T at 628-629. After the conclusion of litigation, the Plaintiff entered merchandise which CBP liquidated in a heading other than 9505, HTSUS. The Plaintiff filed a protest which was denied by CBP. The Plaintiff then filed an action to enforce the stipulated judgment and settlement agreement. The CIT held as follows:
As Traveler conceded during oral argument, Customs has fully complied with the terms of the stipulated judgments, reliquidating the merchandise involved in the litigation and issuing refunds as necessary. The stipulated judgments in no way referenced the settlement agreement, and did not incorporate the agreement's terms. If and to the extent that the settlement agreement and the Customs memorandum prospectively bind Customs to certain classification decisions, that issue is properly raised in a separate action involving newly imported merchandise subject to those classification terms and independent of this settled litigation. Id. at 629.
Like the stipulated judgments in Traveler Trading, the stipulated judgments in Bioriginal are governed by contract law. Traveler Trading, 20 CIT at 629; Bioriginal, Court Nos. 02-00549, 03-00054, 04-00037 and 04-00228. Paragraph three of the stipulated judgments states that “all encapsulated products subject to this action are classifiable under subheading 2106.90.99, HTSUS…” (emphasis added). Thus, the stipulated judgments only apply to the products subject to the action. These products are the merchandise in the protested entries listed in Bioriginal’s court summonses.
Further, in Traveler Trading, the stipulated judgments did not reference the settlement agreement. 20 CIT at 629. Therefore, the CIT held that the settlement agreement could not be enforced as part of the stipulated judgment. Id. Similarly, Bioriginal’s stipulated judgments do not reference the DOJ email or future entries of identical merchandise. As such, the DOJ email and the classification of future entries cannot be enforced as part of the stipulated judgments.
LIMITATION OF COURT DECISIONS
Next, Bioriginal asserts that CBP failed to follow 19 U.S.C. § 1625(d), which provides as follows:
(d) Publication of customs decisions that limit court decisions
A decision that proposes to limit the application of a court decision shall be published in the Customs Bulletin together with notice of opportunity for public comment thereon prior to a final decision.
Bioriginal also cites to 19 C.F.R. § 177.10, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 177.10 Publication of decisions.
(a) Generally. Within 90 days after issuing any interpretive decision under the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, relating to any Customs transaction (prospective, current, or completed), the Customs Service shall publish the decision in the Customs Bulletin or otherwise make it available for public inspection. For purposes of this paragraph an interpretive decision includes any ruling letter, internal advice memorandum, or protest review decision. Disclosure is governed by 31 CFR part 1, 19 CFR part 103, and 19 CFR 177.8(a)(3).
…
(d) Limiting rulings. A published ruling may limit the application of a court decision to the specific article under litigation, or to an article of a specific class or kind of such merchandise, or to the particular circumstances or entries which were the subject of the litigation.
Bioriginal asserts that CBP must follow the aforementioned procedures in order to limit the application of the stipulated judgments. As support, Bioriginal cites to CBP’s “Limitation of the Application of the Decisions of the Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Park B. Smith v. United States, 25 CIT 506 (2001) (Park B. Smith I), affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 347 F.3d 922 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Park B. Smith II),” 40 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 15, pp. 5-34 (April 5, 2006). Bioriginal correctly notes that the litigation in Park B. Smith v. United States ended in a stipulated judgment – Court No. 96-00344 (April 6, 2005). Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1625(d) and 19 C.F.R. § 177.10, CBP published a bulletin notice which limited the court decisions in Park B. Smith I, 25 CIT 506, and Park B. Smith II, 347 F.3d 922, to the specific entries before the courts. In order to limit the stipulated judgments on its capsules, Bioriginal asserts that CBP must follow these same procedures.
However, under 19 USC § 1625(d), CBP must publish a bulletin notice soliciting public comments if CBP proposes to limit a court decision. Stipulated judgments are already limited by the express terms of the judgment. As such, CBP is not required to limit stipulated judgments through notice and comment procedures. CBP’s bulletin notice for Park B. Smith I, 25 CIT 506, and Park B. Smith II, 347 F.3d 922, as cited in the header to the bulletin notice, was a proposal to limit the courts’ decisions.
In contrast to a stipulated judgment, a court decision can create precedent, which is “the making of law by a court in recognizing and applying new rules while administering justice.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1295 (9th Ed. 2009). Stare decisis refers “to the doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1537 (9th Ed. 2009); see also Schott Optical Glass, Inc. v. United States, 750 F.2d 62, 64 (Fed. Cir. 1984). (“the Court of International Trade, however, held that such relitigation was barred by stare decisis, under which courts generally refuse to examine legal issues previously decided in another case.”).
For example, in Schott Optical Glass, Inc. v. United States, 82 Cust. Ct. 11 (1979) (Schott Optical I), the U.S. Customs Court (predecessor to the CIT) determined that the tariff term "optical glass" meant glass which is (a) of very high quality, (b) is used for optical instruments and (c) is capable of performing an optical function. Id. at 18. Later, Schott Optical filed a new suit concerning the tariff classification of optical glass. Schott Optical Glass, Inc. v. United States, 7 CIT 36 (1984) (Schott Optical II). The CIT stated that “the judicial determination of the common meaning of a term used in a statute becomes a matter of law which will be adhered to until a change in the statute necessitates a change in meaning or unless it is shown that the prior decision was clearly erroneous.” Id. at 38-39. As such, the Custom Court’s definition of optical glass was precedential and the CIT was bound by stare decisis to apply that definition to the subject merchandise. Id.
Similarly, in Park B. Smith I, 25 CIT at 508-510, the CIT expanded heading 9505, HTSUS, for “festive articles,” to include utilitarian articles. In Park B. Smith II, 347 F.3d at 926-928, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affirmed the CIT’s expanded definition. As the CIT stated in Schott Optical II, 7 CIT at 38-39, the judicial determination of the meaning of a tariff term remains law until either the statute changes or the decision is shown to be clearly erroneous. Therefore, the courts’ broader definition became binding upon CBP, and reversed CBP’s long-standing practice to exclude utilitarian articles from classification in heading 9505, HTSUS. In order to limit the courts’ definition of the term “festive articles,” CBP had to follow the notice and comment procedures set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 1625 and 19 C.F.R. § 177.10.
As stated above, the Bioriginal stipulated judgments are not court decisions. Although they are signed and filed by the CIT, they are contracts between Bioriginal and CBP regarding the tariff classification and NAFTA eligibility of the entries subject to the action. Thus, CBP is not required to follow the notice and comment procedures because those procedures only apply to court decisions.
Bioriginal argues that stipulated judgments must be construed as precedential. If they are not, Bioriginal asserts that importers will constantly be returning to the courts to re-adjudicate classification decisions on identical merchandise. Bioriginal states that this approach to stipulated judgments cannot be correct as it constitutes bad public policy.
However, in A.D. Sutton v. United States, 32 CIT 804, 807 (2008), the Plaintiff argued that the Government’s prior stipulations that similar bags were classifiable under subheading 3924.10.50 precluded the Government from arguing otherwise. The CIT stated that “this argument lacks merit. In classification cases, ‘[e]ach new entry is a new classification,’ and res judicata does not apply to bar successive litigation over the classification of subsequent similar imported merchandise, even if it involves the same issues of fact and questions of law.” 32 CIT at 807 citing Aves. in Leather, Inc. v. United States, 317 F.3d 1399, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225 (1927).
As the stipulated judgments are governed by contract law and are not precedential, CBP is not required to follow the procedures set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 1625(d) and 19 C.F.R. § 177.10, to limit the application of the stipulated judgments. Rather, they are already limited by their express terms. Although Biorginal argues that CBP’s failure to apply stipulated judgments to future entries will result in more litigation, both the U.S. Supreme Court and the CAFC have held that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to tariff classification litigation. As such, even court decisions involving tariff classification may be re-litigated.
CLASSIFICATION AND NAFTA ELIGIBILITY
Classification under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) is made in accordance with the General Rules of Interpretation (GRI). GRI 1 provides that the classification of goods shall be determined according to the terms of the headings of the tariff schedule and any relative Section or Chapter Notes. In the event that the goods cannot be classified solely on the basis of GRI 1, and if the headings and legal notes do not otherwise require, the remaining GRIs may then be applied.
The HTSUS provisions to be discussed provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
1302 Vegetable saps and extracts; pectic substances, pectinates and pectates; agar-agar and other mucilages and thickeners, whether or not modified, derived from vegetable products:
1515 Other fixed vegetable fats and oils (including jojoba oil) and their fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified:
2106 Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included:
3001 [O]ther human or animal substances prepared for therapeutic or prophylactic uses, not elsewhere specified or included:
3004 Medicaments (excluding goods of heading 3002, 3005 or 3006) consisting of mixed or unmixed products for therapeutic or prophylactic uses, put up in measured doses (including those in the form of transdermal administration systems) or in forms or packings for retail sale:
* * *
Additional U.S. Rule of Interpretation 1(a), HTSUS, provides that:
1. In the absence of special language or context which otherwise requires:
(a) a tariff classification controlled by use (other than actual use) is to be determined in accordance with the use in the United States at, or immediately prior to, the date of importation, of goods of that class or kind to which the imported goods belong, and the controlling use is the principal use.
* * *
With regard to arguments for classification in heading 2106, HTSUS, Bioriginal cites to the following five rulings for support: HQ 962323, dated February 3, 2000 (gingko biloba tablets), HQ 962335, dated February 3, 2000 (saw palmetto softgels), HQ 962388, dated February 23, 2000 (saw palmetto capsules), and NY I82069, dated June 18, 2002 (mixed oil capsules). In the four aforementioned Headquarters rulings, CBP determined that the merchandise was not classifiable as vegetable extracts of heading 1302, HTSUS, and classified the merchandise as food preparations under heading 2106, HTSUS. Since the competing provision in those rulings was heading 1302, HTSUS, and not heading 1515, HTSUS, the analysis in those rulings is inapplicable to the instant AFR. With regard to NY I82069, CBP classified encapsulated mixtures of different types of oils in heading 2106, HTSUS. As the instant capsules only contain EPO, and not a mixture of different oils, the analysis in that ruling is also inapplicable to the instant AFR.
With regard to heading 3004, HTSUS, Bioriginal cites extensively to Inabata Specialty Chemicals v. United States, 29 CIT 419 (2005)(“Inabata”), for support that the EPO capsules are classifiable as medicaments for therapeutic or prophylactic use. In Inabata, the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”) examined the tariff classification of chondroitin sulfate, imported in bulk form, which is prepared from bovine cartilage. Id. at 420. The CIT stated that the “plaintiff produced numerous documents from various sources, which demonstrate that in the commercial world, tablets, capsules, pills, etc., containing [chondroitin sulfate], often in combination with glucosamine, are understood to be specifically intended for [osteoarthritis pain] relief.” Id. at 421. The CIT classified the chondroitin sulfate under heading 3001, which provides for animal substances prepared for therapeutic or prophylactic uses. Id. at 425.
In its analysis, the CIT explained that heading 3001, HTSUS, is a principal use provision governed by Additional U.S. Rule of Interpretation (“AUSR”) 1(a). Id. at 422. Applying AUSR 1(a), the CIT stated that the chondroitin sulfate must belong to the same class or kind of goods which are prepared for therapeutic or prophylactic use. In United States v. Carborundum Co., 536 F.2d 373, 377 (1976), the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated that in order to determine whether an article is included in a particular class or kind of merchandise, the court must consider a variety of factors, including: (1) the general physical characteristics of the merchandise; (2) the channels, class or kind of trade in which the merchandise moves (where the merchandise is sold); (3) the expectation of the ultimate purchasers; (4) the environment of the sale (i.e., accompanying accessories and marketing); (5) usage, if any, in the same manner as merchandise which defines the class; (6) the economic practicality of so using the import; and (7) the recognition in the trade of this use. Id. While these factors were developed under the Tariff Schedule of the United States (predecessor to the HTSUS), the courts have also applied them under the HTSUS. See, e.g. Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2012), Essex Manufacturing, Inc. v. United States, 30 CIT 1 (2006).
Applying the Carborundum factors to chondroitin sulfate, the CIT stated that it shares the same physical characteristics as other pain relief medications because it is manufactured at a high level of purity and is sold in the form of pills, tablets or capsules from the bulk powder. Inabata, 29 CIT at 425. The chondroitin sulfate’s marketing and the expectations of its purchasers centered on its pain relief potential. Id. Further, the products are marketed and sold in the same manner as over-the-counter drugs, including directly to doctors. Id. Finally, the CIT stated that osteoarthritis pain relief is the only current use for chondroitin sulfate, and that the trade recognizes this use. Id.
Turning to the instant EPO capsules, Bioriginal states that they are also prepared for therapeutic or prophylactic use. Applying the Carborundum factors, Bioriginal states that they are similar to other medicaments in that they are put up for retail sale in capsule form. Bioriginal further states that consumers buy the EPO capsules with the expectation that they will help numerous conditions, such as treating symptoms of cardiovascular disease, menopause, rheumatoid arthritis, and others, and that they are marketed for such uses. Bioriginal states that the EPO capsules are sold by companies that sell other therapeutic products. Bioriginal asserts that there is a body of scientific evidence to support EPO’s recognition in the trade as a therapeutic or prophylactic medicament. Finally, Bioriginal cites to the following three rulings for support: NY B88637, dated August 25, 1997 (freeze-dried powdered earth worms classified in 3004, HTSUS), HQ H145541, dated April 4, 2012 (homeopathic remedies classified in 3004, HTSUS), and NY N047475, dated December 29, 2009 (sodium naproxen classified in heading 3004, HTSUS).
Bioriginal’s arguments for classification in heading 3004, HTSUS, are not persuasive. For the Carborundum factors, Bioriginal provides conclusory statements and no substantiation. Bioriginal has not provided our office with the names of vendors or doctors who prescribe EPO, nor any marketing materials, nor any scientific studies on the therapeutic or prophylactic properties of EPO. The chondroitin sulfate in Inabata had only one use - as a pain reliever for osteoarthritis. 29 CIT at 425. Conversely, EPO appears to be marketed and sold for many different uses, only some of which may be therapeutic. EPO has been tested in controlled clinical trials for “atopic dermatitis, rheumatoid arthritis, diabetic neuropathy, multiple sclerosis, various cancers, Raynaud’s phenomenon, ulcerative colitis, preeclampsia, the premenstrual syndrome, menopausal flushing, breast cysts, mastalgia, Sjorgren’s syndrome, schizophrenia and hyperactivity.” However, EPO is also used as a dietary supplement, as an ingredient in soaps, and as an ingredient in cosmetics.
Finally, we note that a principal use analysis is a fact-intensive analysis. As a result, Bioriginal’s citation to three CBP rulings on completely different merchandise is also unpersuasive. For the aforementioned reasons, we do not find that the EPO capsules are principally used as medicaments prepared for therapeutic or prophylactic use.
As CBP is not required to apply the stipulated judgments to future entries and Bioriginal has not presented any new facts regarding the EPO capsules, CBP’s determination in HQ 964014 applies to the instant merchandise and is incorporated herein. The EPO capsules are classified in subheading 1515.90, HTSUS, as vegetable oil. The EPO capsules fail to qualify for preferential treatment under the NAFTA.
HOLDING:
By application of GRI 1 and GRI 6, the EPO capsules are specifically provided for under subheading 1515.90.80, HTSUS, which provides for “Other fixed vegetable fats and oils (including jojoba oil) and their fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified: Other: Other.” The 2010 column one, general rate of duty is 3.2% ad valorem.
Based upon the specific facts considered in this case, the evening primrose oil capsules would not satisfy the NAFTA rule of origin set forth in General Note 12(t)/15, HTSUS. This General Note requires “A change to headings 1501 through 1518 from any other chapter, except heading 3823.” Since the EPO was imported into Canada under heading 1515, the required tariff shift has not been met.
Since classification of the merchandise as indicated above is the same as the liquidated rate, you are instructed to DENY the protest in full.
In accordance with Sections IV and VI of the CBP Protest/Petition Processing Handbook (HB 3500-08A, December 2007, pp. 24 and 26), you are to mail this decision, together with the CBP Form 19, to the protestant no later than 60 days from the date of this letter. Any reliquidation of the entry or entries in accordance with the decision must be accomplished prior to mailing the decision.
Sixty days from the date of the decision, the Office of International Trade, Regulations and Rulings, will make the decision available to CBP personnel, and to the public on the CBP Home Page on the World Wide Web at www.cbp.gov, by means of the Freedom of Information Act, and other methods of public distribution.
Sincerely,
Myles B. Harmon, Director
Commercial and Trade Facilitation Division